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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
We are confronted with a “mind-bending” question that 
has been dubbed “the queen of all threshold issues” in 
arbitration law.  David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 
70 Stan. L. Rev. 363, 370, 422 (2018).  Who decides—a court 
or an arbitrator—whether an agreement exists, when the 
putative agreement includes an arbitration provision 





This seemingly circular and esoteric inquiry implicates 
important concerns, from the more specific question of 
whether the parties’ bargained-for forum is being enforced to 
broader questions about the allocation of powers between 
judges and arbitrators.  In this case, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Jersey concluded that the court had the 
primary power to decide whether fraud in the execution 
vitiated the formation or existence of the contract containing 
the arbitration provision.  The court thus enjoined arbitration 
pending resolution of factual issues that bear upon that claim. 
We agree.  Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 
U.S.C. § 4, questions about the “making of the agreement to 
arbitrate” are for the courts to decide unless the parties have 
clearly and unmistakably referred those issues to arbitration in 
a written contract whose formation is not in issue.  Here, the 
formation of the contract containing the relevant arbitration 
provision is at issue.  Therefore, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Events Leading up to the Arbitration Dispute 
In 2001, MZM Construction Company, a New Jersey 
corporation, hired workers from a local labor union for a 
construction project at the Newark Liberty International 
Airport.  The following year, MZM’s president and sole 
shareholder, Marjorie Perry, signed a one-page, short-form 
agreement (SFA) with the union.  Work on the Newark Airport 
project concluded in 2004. 
The SFA states that, “in order to expand the work 
opportunities of both parties,” MZM and the union “agree to 




Site and General Construction Agreement, which expires April 
30, 2002,” and its successor, “the 2002 Building, Site and 
General Construction Agreement, which successor becomes 
effective May 1, 2002.”  JA64.  Both agreements are 
“incorporated” into the SFA “in full.”  Id.  The parties refer to 
the agreements referenced in the SFA as collective bargaining 
agreements or CBAs.  The SFA does not include any other 
substantive terms, nor does it indicate whether the CBAs were 
attached to it. 
Under the 2002 CBA, employers are required to make 
contributions to the New Jersey Building Laborers’ Statewide 
Benefit Funds in accordance with “the applicable trust 
agreement.”  JA89 (2002 CBA, art. 14.10).  The 2002 CBA 
was to remain in effect through April 2007, when it would 
automatically self-renew on a “year-to-year” basis unless 
terminated by the contracting parties.1  JA98 (2002 CBA art. 
23.10). 
From 2001 through 2018, MZM remitted more than 
$500,000 in contributions to the Funds for work related to the 
Newark Airport project, as well as several other unrelated jobs.  
When making those contributions, MZM executed and 
submitted remittance reports, several of which expressly 
reference “Collective Bargaining Agreements” and certain 
trust agreements.  JA320-45, 355.  Perry signed those reports 
in her capacity as MZM’s president. 
The 2002 CBA and related trust agreement give the 
Funds the authority to audit the books of contracting employers 
to validate that all required contributions have been made.  In 
 
1 There is no contention that MZM has ever attempted 




2018, the Funds invoked this authority to ensure that 
contributions made by MZM from October 2014 through 
September 2017 “were made in accordance with collective 
bargaining agreements.”  JA361.  MZM consented to and 
participated in the audit.  Following the audit, the Funds 
determined that MZM owed about $230,000 in contributions 
for the relevant time period. 
When MZM questioned the basis for the alleged 
liability, the Funds produced the SFA that Perry signed in 
2002, along with an unsigned copy of the 2002 CBA.2  The 
Funds further informed MZM that, absent payment, a 
collection dispute would be submitted to arbitration.  The trust 
agreement gives the Funds the option of going to court or 
“designat[ing] a permanent arbitrator to hear and determine 
collection disputes.”  JA290 (Trust Agreement, art. V § 4).   
In addition, the 2002 CBA contains an arbitration clause 
pursuant to which the contracting parties agree to arbitrate, 
among other things, “questions or grievances involving the 
interpretation and application of this Agreement,” i.e., the 2002 
CBA.  JA96-97 (2002 CBA, art. 21.20(b)); JA68 (2002 CBA 
Preamble (defining the “Agreement” as “this Collective 
Bargaining Agreement”)).  The arbitration clause includes a 
provision stating: “The Arbitrator shall have the authority to 
decide whether an Agreement exists, where that is in dispute.”  
JA97 (2002 CBA, art. 21.20(c)). 
The Funds unilaterally scheduled arbitration to begin in 
November 2018. 
 
2 They also produced a copy of the then-active 2016 




B. MZM’s Action in the District Court 
That same month, MZM filed a complaint against the 
Funds in the District Court, seeking to enjoin arbitration.  It 
also sought a declaratory judgment that MZM is not a signatory 
to any CBA, that MZM has no obligation to arbitrate under any 
CBA, and that MZM is not liable to the Funds under any CBA.  
The gravamen of the complaint is that fraud in the execution 
voided the SFA and the incorporation of the CBAs, and 
therefore, no agreement exists between MZM and the Funds. 
In a supporting declaration submitted with the 
complaint, Perry admits that she signed the SFA in 2002 but 
claims she never intended to execute a “statewide [CBA]” 
requiring MZM to hire union workers and pay fringe benefits 
on all of its construction projects within the state.  JA59 (Perry 
Decl. ¶ 10); see also JA44 (Compl. ¶ 15).  According to Perry, 
while MZM was working on the Newark Airport project, a 
local union representative, Joe Taylor, approached and asked 
her to “sign a single-project agreement . . . because the union 
had nothing on record for MZM for the Newark Airport job.”  
JA58 (Perry Decl. ¶ 9).  Taylor “confirmed” that the document 
he needed her to sign “was only for the Newark Airport job.”  
Id.  “[A]t no time did . . . Taylor advise” Perry that he wanted 
her to sign a statewide CBA.  Id.  He said that if she did not 
sign the SFA, the union would pull its workers from the job.  
Perry “signed the one-page document to avoid any labor 
interruptions on the job.”  Id. 
Perry avers that she relied on Taylor’s characterization 
of the SFA when signing it.  Taylor “normally dealt with 
[Perry] over the years,” and she contends that he knew from 
their “many dealings” that MZM is an “open shop,” id., 




union affiliation and only hires union workers “from time to 
time,” for instance, when directed to do so by a site owner or 
general contractor for a specific project.  JA57 (Perry Decl. ¶¶ 
5-6).  Taylor was also aware that MZM “had no interest in 
becoming a party to any statewide [CBA].”  JA58 (Perry Decl. 
¶ 9).  Perry claims she never received or even saw a copy of 
the 2002 CBA or any CBA until after the audit in 2018. 
According to the complaint, MZM and the union’s 
conduct during the sixteen years following the execution of the 
2002 SFA did not accord with a statewide CBA but rather 
reflected their regular course of dealing.  When MZM needed 
union labor because an owner or general contractor required it, 
the union would provide laborers and MZM would pay wages 
and fringe benefits to the Funds. 
The Funds moved to dismiss the complaint and opposed 
the injunction application.  They asked the District Court to 
refer MZM’s fraud-in-the-execution claim to the arbitrator, 
along with the underlying collection dispute, in accordance 
with the 2002 CBA’s arbitration provision.  The Funds further 
asserted that MZM had not stated a claim of fraud in the 
execution but rather fraud in the inducement.  They argued that 
this distinction is material to whether the court or the arbitrator 
decides if an enforceable contract exists.  The Funds submitted 
evidence about the parties’ alleged course of dealings that, 
according to the Funds, demonstrated a mutual intent to be 
bound by the CBAs. 
In December 2018, the District Court held a hearing in 
which it framed the issue as follows: “The task before us . . . is 
to figure out whether this [dispute] stays here or goes to the 
arbitrator.”  JA422.  After hearing argument, the court 




between the parties based on MZM’s claim of fraud in the 
execution and granted a preliminary injunction to preserve the 
status quo while it resolved that claim.  The District Court later 
entered an order enjoining arbitration during the pendency of 
this action.  It also “denied” the motion to dismiss “because the 
arbitrability issue cannot be decided without further factual 
development.”  JA7.  The court authorized “expedited 
discovery.”  JA7.  The Funds timely appealed from that order. 
While that appeal was pending, the Funds moved the 
District Court for reconsideration under Rules 54(b) and 60(b) 
and for an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1, which authorizes 
a district court to rule on motions that are barred pending 
appeal.  The Funds asked the court to indicate that, if the case 
were remanded, it would enforce the arbitration agreement 
based on newly discovered evidence showing that, in 1999, 
Perry had signed an earlier SFA that expressly incorporated the 
predecessor to the 2002 CBA.  The Funds argued that this new 
evidence further demonstrated that Perry understood what she 
was signing in 2002 and intended to be bound by the CBA and 
its arbitration provision. 
In August 2019, the District Court denied the motion.  It 
determined that, despite the production of the 1999 SFA, there 
were still “several disputed facts that suggest that the parties 
did not intend to incorporate the CBA.”3  JA31. The court 
elucidated its reasoning for refusing to compel arbitration, 
noting that there was a presumption that issues of 
“arbitrability” are for the court to decide and that to “overcome 
 
3 The opinion is reported at MZM Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
New Jersey Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Benefit Funds, No. 18-




this presumption, an arbitration clause must contain clear and 
unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability.”  JA21 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and 
citations omitted).  The court concluded that the 2002 CBA’s 
arbitration provision—empowering the arbitrator to decide 
whether an agreement exists—was not “sufficient to send the 
matter to an arbitrator where a party legitimately disputes 
whether it ever saw, heard about, or agreed to a CBA at all, and 
where it even disputes the scope of the SFA that supposedly 
incorporated the CBA.”  JA32 (Op. 25 n.8). 
The Funds timely appealed that decision, and we 
consolidated both of their appeals.4 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
The District Court treated “the injunction application” 
as “the functional equivalent of an opposition to a motion to 
compel arbitration by the Funds.”  JA8.  We agree.   
 
4 This dispute arises out of a putative contract between 
an employer and a labor union under the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C § 141, et seq., pursuant to 
which a contracting employer is required to make certain 
contributions to benefit funds established under the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 
U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.  The District Court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as well as under the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185(a), and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the Funds 
appeal from an order enjoining arbitration.  Nat’l Football 





The combined effect of the District Court’s decision to 
enjoin arbitration, deny the motion to dismiss, and require the 
Funds to litigate the arbitrability issue, i.e., the fraud-in-the-
execution claim, was to deny the Funds’ asserted right to have 
that issue submitted to arbitration.  See Bacon v. Avis Budget 
Grp., Inc., 959 F.3d 590, 599 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating, for 
jurisdictional purposes, that the FAA makes no distinction 
between an order denying arbitration and final orders “that 
accomplish the same end” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
As such, we may exercise plenary review and “affirm on any 
grounds supported by the record.”5  Id. at 599 n.5. 
In reviewing a district court’s refusal to compel 
arbitration at the pleadings stage, we accept as true the factual 
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the party opposing arbitration.  Guidotti v. Legal 
Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 
2013).  In addition to the complaint, we may consider “exhibits 
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as 
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims 
are based upon these documents[.]”  Id. (citation omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The critical question in this appeal is who decides 
MZM’s contract defense, i.e., its claim that it never intended to 
execute an SFA incorporating statewide CBAs with an 
 
5 MZM urges us to apply an abuse of discretion 
standard, because the order appealed from involves an 
injunction.  Even if we did, our analysis would not change.  
This appeal raises purely legal questions that are subject to de 
novo review.  Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, 




arbitration provision but rather intended to execute a single-
project agreement with no mention of arbitration.  As 
explained more fully below, the answer to that question is 
bound up with the determination of whether MZM’s claim 
sounds in fraud in the execution, which voids a contract as if it 
had never been executed, or fraud in the inducement, which 
presumes the existence of a contract but renders it voidable. 
The District Court has not yet ruled on the merits of 
MZM’s claim.  Rather, it made three antecedent rulings: (i) the 
court has the primary power to decide questions about the 
formation of an arbitration agreement (ii) MZM put the 
formation of the relevant arbitration agreement in issue by 
stating a claim of fraud in the execution, and (iii) genuine 
issues of fact need to be explored in discovery before resolving 
that claim.  The Funds challenge all three rulings, so we 
address each in turn. 
A. The District Court’s Power 
The threshold issue is whether the District Court has the 
power to resolve questions about the formation or existence of 
a contract when the putative contract includes a provision 
delegating “the authority to decide whether an Agreement 
exists” to the arbitrator.  JA97 (2002 CBA, art. 21.20(c)). 
1. The FAA’s Pro-Arbitration Policy and the 
Severability Doctrine 
We begin with the FAA, the federal statute that guides 




federal labor law.6  “The FAA establishes a strong federal 
policy in favor of compelling arbitration over litigation.”  
Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 
2000); see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576, 581 (2008) (noting that “Congress enacted the FAA to 
replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a national 
policy favoring it” (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted)); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 
(2001) (explaining that “the FAA was a response to hostility of 
American courts to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements”). 
 
6 The District Court treated the CBA’s arbitration 
provision as if it were governed by the FAA, a premise that the 
parties accept.  We proceed under the same premise.  Although 
the FAA applies to commercial arbitration agreements by its 
own terms, it is well-accepted that labor arbitration disputes 
arising under federal law should be resolved in accordance 
with the FAA, even though labor arbitration agreements may 
not be technically governed by the statute.  See Granite Rock 
Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298-99 & n.6 
(2010) (applying FAA cases to a CBA’s arbitration provision, 
“because they employ the same rules of arbitrability that 
govern labor cases”); United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-
CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1987) (noting that “federal 
courts have often looked to the [FAA] for guidance in labor 
arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 
301 of the [LMRA], 29 U.S.C. § 185, empowers the federal 
courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern [s]uits 
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization under the federal labor laws” (internal quotation 




Following the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme 
Court has steadily advanced this policy by guarding against 
unwarranted judicial interference with arbitration.  See, e.g., 
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 
524, 529 (2019) (holding that courts cannot decide arbitrability 
issues that the parties agreed to submit to arbitration even if 
“the argument for arbitration is wholly groundless”); Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 
(1967) (holding that arbitrators have the primary power to 
decide legal issues relating to the parties’ contract absent 
evidence indicating the parties intended to exclude those issues 
from arbitration). 
Of relevance here is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Prima Paint, which established what is known as the 
“severability doctrine.”  Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 105 (citing Prima 
Paint, 388 U.S. at 404).  After looking at the FAA’s text and 
structure, in particular sections 2, 3 and 4, the Court held that 
an arbitration clause is “severable” and independently 
enforceable from the rest of the contract in which it is 
contained.  Id.; see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400, 403-04.  
Under this severability rule, a party cannot avoid arbitration by 
attacking the contract containing the arbitration clause as a 
whole (the “container contract”).  Rather, the party opposing 
arbitration must challenge “the arbitration clause itself.”  
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403.   
For instance, a claim of fraud in the inducement of the 
arbitration clause is for the court to decide, but a claim of fraud 
in the inducement of the container contract is for the arbitrator.  
Id. at 403-04.  Because the party opposing arbitration had only 
alleged fraud in the inducement of the container contract, the 
Prima Paint Court referred that issue to the arbitrators in 




Paint, absent a specific challenge to the validity of the 
arbitration clause specifically, the court must treat it as a valid 
and enforceable agreement and refer any challenges to the 
container contract to arbitration.  Id. at 406.    
2. The FAA Requires a Court to Be Satisfied that an 
Agreement Was Made 
Prima Paint did not address whether the severability 
doctrine applies in cases where the formation of the container 
contract is at issue.  But the Supreme Court has made clear that 
the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” 
which underpins the severability doctrine, “is at bottom a 
policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual 
arrangements.”  Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 105 (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
625 (1985)) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Simply 
put, without an agreement to arbitrate, there can be no 
arbitration.  Id. at 105, 107-08; Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. 
Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980). 
So, who decides whether an arbitration agreement exists 
when the formation or the existence of the container contract 
is disputed—the court or the arbitrator? 
We answered that question in Sandvik.   There, we 
turned to section 4 of the FAA, which provides that a federal 
court must compel arbitration “upon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue,” 9 
U.S.C. § 4, and we held that this provision “affirmatively 




existence of an arbitration agreement, namely the element of 
mutual assent.7  Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 108-09.   
The court must resolve those questions even when the 
answer requires passing judgment on the formation or 
existence of the container contract, because “the doctrine of 
severability presumes an underlying, existent, agreement.”  Id. 
at 106 (“[T]hough arbitration clauses are severable from their 
larger contracts, the question whether the underlying contract 
 
7 The formalities of contract formation also require 
adequate consideration.  We read Sandvik as being limited only 
to claims that, if proven, would negate the element of mutual 
assent.  If mutual assent is undisputed, a claim that the 
container contract alone lacks consideration would not be 
enough to put the formation or existence of the arbitration 
agreement in issue.  The severability doctrine presumes that the 
mutual promise to arbitrate is sufficient consideration to 
sustain an arbitration agreement separate and apart from the 
container contract.  Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 
595, 603 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When both parties have agreed to be 
bound by arbitration, adequate consideration exists and the 
arbitration agreement should be enforced.”); Sandvik, 220 F.3d 
at 108 (citing Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, 715 
F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1983) (“The agreement to arbitrate and 
the agreement to buy and sell . . . are separate.  [Plaintiff’s] 
promise to arbitrate was given in exchange for [defendant’s] 
promise to arbitrate and each promise was sufficient 
consideration for the other.” (alterations supplied)); see also, 
e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 417, 




contains a valid arbitration clause still precedes all others.”).8  
We explained that this threshold determination is “a necessary 
prerequisite” in fulfilling the court’s gatekeeping function.  Id. 
at 107.  Otherwise, arbitrators would be allowed “to determine 
their own jurisdiction, something that is not permitted in the 
federal jurisprudence of arbitration[.]”  Id. at 111. 
3. The Contractual Delegation of Powers to 
Arbitrators 
In Sandvik, we also noted that, under Supreme Court 
precedent, contracting parties are free to refer arbitrability 
questions to arbitration, including “disputes of the nature 
before us today[.]”  Id. 111.  In other words, parties may 
contractually bestow upon arbitrators the power to decide their 
own jurisdiction, id., a well-established arbitration principle 
known as competence-competence or arbitrating arbitrability.9  
 
8 In Par-Knit, we held that the party opposing arbitration 
could not be bound by an arbitration provision before the court 
determined if the signatory had authority to bind the company 
to the container contract, but we did not address the 
implications of the severability doctrine.  636 F.2d at 54-55. 
9 The concept of “arbitrability” encompasses all sorts of 
“gateway” issues regarding the parties’ obligation to arbitrate, 
“such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether 
their [arbitration] agreement covers a particular controversy.”  
Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019) (citation omitted); 
see also Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 
2019) (“To the extent that a particular ground implicates the 
threshold question of whether the parties are bound by an 
agreement to arbitrate, it is referred to as a gateway question 




See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei 
Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Blanton 
v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 849-50 (6th 
Cir. 2020).   
We also emphasized the Supreme Court’s admonition 
that courts “should not assume that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clea[r] and unmistakabl[e] 
evidence that they did so.”  Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 111 (quoting 
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 
(1995)) (alterations supplied); see also AT & T Techs., Inc. v. 
Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (“Unless the 
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the 
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be 
decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”).   
Since our decision in Sandvik, the Supreme Court has 
further addressed the procedures for determining who decides 
“gateway questions of arbitrability.”  Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  In Rent-A-Center, the Court recognized 
that contracting parties can agree that arbitrators, not courts, 
shall resolve arbitrability issues by including in the contract a 
so-called “delegation provision” conferring upon the 
arbitrators the “exclusive authority” to decide those gateway 
matters.  561 U.S. at 68-69, 71.  The Court held that, under the 
FAA, a delegation provision is itself “an additional, antecedent 
[arbitration] agreement.”  Id. at 70.  Think of a delegation 
provision as a mini-arbitration agreement within a broader 
arbitration agreement within a broader contract, “something 
akin to Russian nesting dolls.”  Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see 1 Domke on Com. Arb. § 15:11.50 (“The goal 




preventing the parties from wasting time and money fighting 
in court before going to arbitration.”). 
The Rent-A-Center Court explained that the FAA 
operates on the delegation provision as it does on any other 
arbitration agreement.  561 U.S. at 70.  Thus, consistent with 
the severability doctrine, unless the party opposing arbitration 
challenges “the delegation provision specifically,” the district 
court “must treat it as valid” and “must enforce it” by sending 
“any challenge to the validity” of the underlying arbitration 
agreement to the arbitrator.  Id. at 72.   
Even when the grounds for invalidating the delegation 
provision and the underlying agreement are the same, the 
arbitrability challenge must still be directed at the delegation 
provision specifically to invoke a court’s power to intervene.  
Id. at 71.  The Court thus concluded that, because the party 
opposing arbitration failed to direct its unconscionability 
challenge at the delegation provision, it was for the arbitrator 
to resolve that gateway issue.  Id. at 72 (observing that 
“[n]owhere in his opposition” in the district court “did [the 
plaintiff] even mention the delegation provision”); see 
MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“[W]ithout a specific challenge to a delegation provision, the 
court must treat that provision as valid and enforce it according 
to FAA § 4[.]”). 
4. Application to this Case: The Intersection Between 
the Severability Doctrine and the Delegation of 
Contract Formation Disputes 
So, what happens when, as here, the container contract, 
whose formation or existence is being challenged, has a 




whether an agreement exists?  Who decides the threshold issue 
then? 
The Funds point out that MZM attacked the validity of 
the SFA and CBA (the container contract) and the CBA’s 
arbitration provision (the broader arbitration agreement) but 
failed to direct its challenge specifically at the delegation 
provision (the agreement to arbitrate arbitrability).  According 
to the Funds, absent any allegation that the delegation 
provision itself is invalid as required under Rent-A-Center and 
MacDonald, the District Court was obligated to enforce it—no 
questions asked. 
That argument has some appeal.  After all, Perry admits 
that she intended to enter into some sort of agreement with the 
union when she signed the SFA, which expressly incorporates 
the 2002 CBA “in full.”  JA64.  And MZM does not argue that 
the terms of the SFA alone are ineffective for incorporating the 
CBAs.  Thus, on the face of these documents, the delegation 
provision seems to be a valid agreement to arbitrate the 
existence of the CBA.  Without any allegation or argument 
indicating why the delegation provision itself is defective, the 
court is left to connect the dots on its own, something that Rent-
A-Center seems to forbid.  See Restatement (Third) of the U.S. 
Law of Int’l Comm. Arb. § 2-12 & com. c (Tentative Draft No. 
4, 2015) (“[T]here may be circumstances in which, pursuant to 
the separability doctrine, a court finds that an arbitration 
agreement came into existence even though the contract in 
which it is found may not have.”); George A. Bermann, The 
Supreme Court Trilogy and Its Impact on U.S. Arbitration 
Law, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 551, 557-58 (2011) (“[E]ven a 
party that steadfastly insists that it is a stranger to an agreement 




contract, find itself having given a tribunal primary authority 
to answer that very question.”).   
MZM sees things differently.  It believes that Rent-A-
Center and MacDonald apply only when a party challenges the 
validity or enforceability of an existing agreement, not when, 
as here, the formation or existence of the entire agreement is in 
issue. 
Reduced to its essence, the parties’ dispute sits at the 
intersection of the severability doctrine as articulated in Rent-
A-Center, which requires that an unchallenged delegation 
provision in a disputed contract be enforced as presumptively 
valid, and section 4 of the FAA, which, as construed in 
Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 109, “affirmatively requires” a court to 
rule on the formation of the container contract. 
Although the Third Circuit has not since Rent-A-Center 
squarely addressed this issue, we believe that our decision in 
Sandvik compels the same outcome here.  Recall that, in 
Sandvik, we expressly rejected the argument that the 
severability doctrine applies when the threshold arbitrability 
issue is whether the parties mutually assented to the container 
contract.  220 F.3d at 101, 106, 108.  For good reason: Lack of 
assent to the container contract necessarily implicates the 
status of the arbitration agreement, when the container contract 
and the arbitration provision depend on the same act for their 
legal effect.  Id. at 109, 111.  It is thus inevitable that a court 
will need to decide questions about the parties’ mutual assent 
to the container contract to satisfy itself that an arbitration 
agreement exists and vice versa.  That is no less true when the 
container contract includes or incorporates a delegation 
provision.  See China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 288 (“[A] 




power to determine its own jurisdiction, if the parties never 
entered into it.”).  Given that Rent-A-Center made clear that the 
FAA operates on the delegation provision as it does on any 
other arbitration agreement, we see no reason to deviate from 
our analysis in Sandvik, and we conclude that the degree of 
specificity required in Rent-A-Center does not apply here.10 
We find further support for this view in the Supreme 
Court’s arbitrability jurisprudence.  In Rent-A-Center itself, the 
Court drew a distinction between, on the one hand, questions 
about the validity or enforceability of an arbitration provision 
in an existing contract and, on the other hand, questions about 
whether an agreement “was ever concluded” in the first place.  
561 U.S. at 70 n.2 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006)).  The Court 
emphasized that it was only addressing the former, id., perhaps 
implying that its decision did not apply to the latter.  In Granite 
Rock, the Court again suggested that questions about contract 
formation are different, and listed arbitrability issues that a 
“court must resolve” before referring a matter to arbitration, 
which “always include whether the [arbitration] clause was 
agreed to.”  561 U.S. at 297 (emphases added); see also Henry 
 
10 We note that MZM directed its fraud in the execution 
challenge at the SFA incorporating the CBAs and, on that 
basis, disputed any agreement to arbitrate under the CBA’s 
arbitration provision.  It never mentioned the “delegation 
provision” specifically by name or even cited the relevant 
subpart.  Though this was enough to put the Funds on notice 
that MZM was challenging the formation or existence of any 
arbitration agreement predicated on the execution of the SFA, 
we think it prudent for parties to always be as precise as 




Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 530 (“[B]efore referring a dispute to an 
arbitrator, the court determines whether a valid arbitration 
agreement exists.”). 
To be sure, none of those cases, or any other Supreme 
Court case for that matter, dealt with a contract-formation 
dispute involving a delegation provision assigning that task to 
the arbitrator, so this precise situation remains an open 
question.  While in this Court we are bound by Sandvik, we do 
not follow it blindly.  Whether and how Sandvik applies here 
is a thorny issue post-Rent-A-Center, and one that could 
reasonably go either way depending on how one weighs the 
FAA’s competing policies.   
No matter how this question is resolved, there is a risk 
that one of the parties will be denied the full benefit of its 
bargain or the forum to which it is entitled.  If the court were 
allowed to intervene at the outset and ultimately conclude that 
a validly formed agreement exists, the Funds will have been 
theoretically denied the contractual right to have that issue 
resolved by the arbitrator in the first instance and will have 
been subjected to litigation inconveniences that they were 
seeking to avoid by bargaining for a delegation provision.  
Inversely, if the court enforces the delegation provision 
without first considering the existence of the container 
contract, and the arbitrator later concludes that no agreement 
ever existed, then MZM will have been compelled to arbitrate 
a matter it never agreed to and will have been denied a judicial 
forum in the process.   
We weighed those concerns in Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 111, 
and we weigh them today in light of Rent-A-Center and its 
progeny.  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated 




Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 67, 69, we believe that the text of 
section 4 of the FAA—mandating that the court be “satisfied” 
that an arbitration agreement exists—tilts the scale in favor of 
a judicial forum when a party rightfully resists arbitration on 
grounds that it never agreed to arbitrate at all.  Indeed, it can 
hardly be said that contracting parties clearly and unmistakably 
agreed to have an arbitrator decide the existence of an 
arbitration agreement when one of the parties has put the 
existence of that very agreement in dispute.  See Rent-A-
Center, 561 U.S. at 69 n.1 (noting that the “‘clear and 
unmistakable’ requirement . . . pertains to the 
parties’ manifestation of intent”) (citation omitted)). 
We are not alone in reaching this conclusion.  After 
Rent-A-Center, several sister circuits have confronted this 
same threshold question and have declined to enforce 
delegation provisions when the formation or existence of the 
container contract was at issue.  See In re: Auto. Parts Antitrust 
Litig., 951 F.3d 377, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2020); Berkeley Cty. Sch. 
Dist. v. Hub Int’l Ltd., 944 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 2019); 
Lloyd’s Syndicate 457 v. FloaTEC, L.L.C., 921 F.3d 508, 515 
(5th Cir. 2019); Nebraska Mach. Co. v. Cargotec Sols., LLC, 
762 F.3d 737, 741 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2014).11  We join these 
circuits in adopting the view that, under section 4 of the FAA, 
courts retain the primary power to decide questions of whether 
the parties mutually assented to a contract containing or 
incorporating a delegation provision. 
 
11 District courts in the Seventh Circuit have adopted 
this position as well.  See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. 
Tractable Inc., No. 18 C 7246, 2019 WL 2011092, at *2 (N.D. 




We conclude our analysis of this threshold question by 
echoing Sandvik’s disclaimer that nothing in our decision 
today precludes parties from delegating issues of contract 
formation like the one before us.  220 F.3d at 111.  But we 
caution that the legal effect of the delegation must come from 
an “independent source” outside the contract whose formation 
or existence is being disputed.  Id. at 108.  For instance, parties 
can enter into pre-negotiation contracts in which they agree to 
arbitrate all arbitrability issues pertaining to future contracts 
between them.  See id. at 111-12.  Or, once a dispute has arisen, 
they can agree by stipulation to submit their entire dispute to 
arbitration, including any gateway issues regarding the 
formation of the original contract containing the delegation 
provision.  See Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of Int’l 
Comm. Arb. § 2-12(b) & com. d (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015).  
Even then, the arbitrators’ determination as to whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate in the first place will be reviewable 
de novo by a court of competent jurisdiction on the backend if 
the arbitrators render an award in the absence of a validly 
existing arbitration agreement over a party’s objection.  China 
Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 288-89. 
In brief, we reaffirm our decision in Sandvik and hold 
that, unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to 
arbitrate questions of contract formation in a contract whose 
formation is not in issue, those gateway questions are for the 
courts to decide. 
B. Fraud in the Execution 
The next question then is whether MZM has put the 
formation of the arbitration agreement “in issue” by stating a 
claim of fraud in the execution.  To state a claim, MZM must 




Under the FAA, agreements to arbitrate must be treated 
like “all other contracts.” Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 
443.  When determining whether an arbitration agreement 
exists, we “apply ordinary state-law principles” governing 
contract formation.  James v. Glob. TelLink Corp, 852 F.3d 
262, 265 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 
944).  The District Court applied New Jersey law, and the 
parties do not dispute that decision. 
Under New Jersey law, “[a]n agreement to arbitrate, 
like any other contract, must be the product of mutual assent, 
as determined under customary principles of contract law.”  Id. 
at 265 (quoting Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 
306, 312-13 (N.J. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Here, the existence of an arbitration agreement comes into play 
because the SFA purports to incorporate the full terms of an 
unattached and unsigned CBA with an arbitration provision. 
New Jersey law allows unsigned documents to be 
incorporated by reference.  However, for the incorporation to 
be effective, “the separate document must be described in such 
terms that its identity may be ascertained beyond doubt and . . . 
the party to be bound by the terms must have had knowledge 
of and assented to the incorporated terms.”  Bacon, 959 F.3d at 
600 (quoting Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. 
v. Quinn, 983 A.2d 604, 617 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  It is undisputed that the SFA 
describes the incorporated agreements with enough detail to 
identify them as the CBAs.  The point of contention is whether 
Perry had “knowledge of and assented to” the essential terms 
in those documents.  Id. 
“It is the general rule that where a party affixes [her] 




arises that [she] read, understood and assented to its terms and 
[she] will not be heard to complain that [she] did not 
comprehend the effect of [her] act in signing.”  Peter W. Kero, 
Inc. v. Terminal Const. Corp., 78 A.2d 814, 817 (N.J. 1951); 
see Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, 
and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that 
he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it 
contained.” (quoting Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 
(1875))).  Indeed, if all it took to avoid a signed contract was 
to claim ignorance of its content or legal effect, “contracts 
would not be worth the paper on which they are written.”  
Upton, 91 U.S. at 50; see Novitsky v. Am. Consulting 
Engineers, L.L.C., 196 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1999). 
It is undisputed that Perry signed the SFA in 2002.  Her 
signature thus creates a presumption that she “read, 
understood, and assented to” the terms of that document.  Kero, 
78 A.2d at 817.  Considering that the single sentence in the 
SFA does nothing more than incorporate the longer-form 
CBAs, it is difficult to conceive how Perry would not have 
understood that all the essential terms of her agreement with 
the union were to be found in the separately incorporated 
documents and that, by virtue of signing the SFA, she was 
agreeing to be bound by those terms.  However, Perry avers 
that she signed the SFA “without knowledge or a reasonable 
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential 
terms.”  JA53 (Compl. ¶ 87).   
Perry never asked to see the incorporated agreements.  
Nor does she contend that, had she asked, she would have been 
refused.  Had Perry requested and studied those documents, she 
could have easily identified the alleged error, and “this entire 




Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 
F.3d 1098, 1108 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting fraud-in-the-
execution claim where employer failed to read the contract 
despite having opportunities to do so).  Her failure to read is 
not by itself sufficient to avoid the legal effects of her 
signature, especially given her extensive business training and 
nearly thirty-year experience running a construction company 
for high-profile projects.  See Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. Ass’n 
Local Union No.27, AFL-CIO v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc., 673 F. 
Supp. 2d 313, 328 & n.23 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Walking blindfolded 
through one’s business affairs does not excuse the ensuing 
collision.” (citing Novitsky, 196 F.3d at 702)). 
But that is not the end of the inquiry.  There is an 
exception to this general rule when a party’s “signature is 
obtained by fraud or imposition in the execution of the 
instrument.”  Kero, 78 A.2d at 817 (citations omitted).  Fraud 
in the execution (or fraud in the factum) occurs when a party is 
compelled to sign the instrument “by reason of a 
misrepresentation intended to deceive [her] as to its purport or 
content[.]”  Id. at 817-18.  Because this rule is intended to 
protect both “the unwary and foolish as well as the vigilant,” 
the signer’s negligence in failing to read the instrument or “in 
trusting a representation” does not excuse the other party’s 
intentional fraudulent act.  Id. at 818.  “This is particularly true 
where a relation of natural trust and confidence, though not 
strictly a fiduciary relation, exists between the [contracting] 
parties.”  Id. at 818 (citing 5 Williston on Contracts § 1516 
(rev. ed. 1937)).   
Fraud in the execution may also be present “when a 
party executes an agreement with neither knowledge nor 
reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or 




Connors v. Fawn Min. Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490, 491 (3d Cir. 
1994) (applying the Uniform Commercial Code in a labor case 
arising out of the LMRA and ERISA) (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163 
(1981).  Although excusable ignorance does not require an 
affirmative intent to defraud, it typically involves some sort of 
misconduct or imposition that cuts off the signer’s opportunity 
to read, such as “significant time pressure” and reliance on an 
erroneous “assurance” that the parties’ oral understanding had 
been or would be accurately memorialized in an instrument.  
Connors, 30 F.3d at 488, 492-93.  In short, “[f]ailing to read a 
contract does not excuse performance unless fraud or 
misconduct by the other party prevented one from reading.”  
New Gold Equities Corp. v. Jaffe Spindler Co., 181 A.3d 1050, 
1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2018) (citation omitted). 
The complaint does not explicitly allege an intent to 
defraud or mislead.  And at oral argument, MZM disavowed 
that it was asserting a claim of willful fraud or “bait and 
switch.”  Oral Arg. Audio 43:45-44:45.  Rather, MZM claims 
that Perry signed the SFA incorporating statewide CBAs with 
an arbitration provision in reliance on Taylor’s assurance that 
it was a single-project agreement without any mention of 
arbitration.  Contracting parties have a right to trust each other 
to draw up paperwork that accurately memorializes “the oral 
understanding between them,” and the “presentation of the 
paper for signature is in itself a representation that the terms of 
such oral agreement have been or will be embodied in the 
writing.”  Kero, 78 A.2d at 818; see also Connors, 30 F.3d at 
493 (concluding that fraud in the execution occurs where a 
party “surreptitiously substitutes a materially different 




According to Perry, Taylor “confirmed” that the 
document he needed her to sign “was only for the Newark 
Airport job,” and “at no time did . . . Taylor advise her” that he 
wanted her to agree to statewide CBAs.  JA58 (Perry Decl. ¶ 
9).  And there is no indication that they discussed arbitration.  
We can infer from these allegations that Perry and Taylor 
reached an oral understanding on a single-project agreement 
with no mention of an arbitration provision and that Taylor 
assured Perry that the SFA reflected that understanding.  Yet 
Taylor presented her with an SFA that was “materially 
different” insofar as it incorporated statewide, self-renewing 
CBAs with an arbitration provision.  Connors, 30 F.3d at 493. 
Perry alleges that Taylor never provided her copies of 
the incorporated agreements.  Nor did she ask for them.  These 
facts cut both ways, because they can suggest an effort on the 
part of Taylor to keep those documents from Perry or 
something less nefarious such as the parties’ common failure 
to act diligently.  We view these allegations in favor of MZM, 
as we must at this stage.  Moreover, Perry alleges that she had 
good reason to trust and rely on Taylor’s representation 
because, after having dealt with him for many years, he knew 
and understood that MZM was an open shop and was not 
interested in entering into any statewide CBA with or without 
an arbitration provision. 
It bears noting that the complaint seems to allege that 
the union did not intend to enter into statewide CBAs.  If so, 
this could be a simple case of mutual mistake.  But that is not 
the only plausible reading of the complaint.  Viewed in the light 
most favorable to MZM, the allegations also raise a reasonable 
suspicion that this was something more than an innocent 
mistake.  Perry alleges that she felt a sense of urgency to sign 




that the union would pull workers from the job if she refused 
to sign.   
The threat of halting construction could heighten a 
reasonable person’s sense of urgency to sign the SFA on the 
spot, as any disruptions on a project that had been underway 
for more than a year could lead to unwanted delays and higher 
costs.  Indeed, Perry claims she signed the SFA “to avoid any 
labor interruptions on the job.”  JA58 (Perry Decl. ¶ 9).  We 
can infer from these allegations that Taylor intentionally 
pressured Perry or created an undue imposition that, combined 
with Perry’s reasonable reliance in his assurance, effectively 
foreclosed any opportunity to review the incorporated 
agreements before signing the SFA.  And once it was signed, 
everyone went about their business. 
These allegations are enough to state a claim for fraud 
in the execution of the SFA by reason of excusable ignorance.  
Without a validly executed SFA, there could be no 
incorporation of the CBAs, and without validly incorporated 
CBAs, there could be no arbitration agreement. 
The Funds concede that fraud in the execution negates 
mutual assent, Connors, 30 F.3d at 493, and that such a claim 
belongs in court under Sandvik.  To avoid that outcome, the 
Funds astutely argue that MZM has not pleaded fraud in the 
execution but rather fraud in the inducement.12 
 
12 The Funds also raise this argument to dispute that 
MZM has mounted a proper defense under ERISA.  That issue 
goes to the merits of the underlying dispute, which is not 
currently before us.  At this stage, our concern is only whether 




Fraud in the inducement occurs when someone signs the 
document they intended to sign, but their assent was induced 
by a material misrepresentation about facts external to that 
document.  See Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 109; 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud 
and Deceit § 2 (2020).  For example, if a party misrepresents 
that the price of cheese will increase to induce someone into 
signing a contract to buy milk in bulk, that is fraud in the 
inducement.  But if a party assures its counterparty that it is 
signing a contract for cheese when it is in fact a contract for 
milk, that is fraud in the execution.  See Connors, 30 F.3d at 
490 (“[Fraud in the inducement] induces a party to assent to 
something he otherwise would not have; [fraud in the 
execution] induces a party to believe the nature of his act is 
something entirely different than it actually is.” (quoting 
Southwest Adm’r, Inc. v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 
(9th Cir. 1986)).   
Again, the difference between those claims matters 
because, unlike fraud in the execution, which renders the entire 
agreement “void ab initio” as if it never existed, fraud in the 
inducement only renders the contract “voidable,” giving the 
defrauded party the option of rescinding the contract or 
claiming damages for deceit.  See Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 107, 
109-10.  Thus, unless MZM were alleging fraud in the 
inducement of the delegation provision, the District Court 
would be required to submit the claim to the arbitrator pursuant 
 
475 U.S. at 649 (“[I]n deciding whether the parties have agreed 
to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to 




to the 2002 CBA’s arbitration provision under Sandvik and 
Rent-A-Center.13 
MZM does not claim fraud in the inducement.  Nowhere 
does the complaint allege that Perry intended to assent to a 
statewide CBA with an arbitration provision.  It alleges the 
opposite.  See JA48 (Compl. ¶ 47) (“The only conceivable 
basis for the Funds to compel MZM to arbitrate any dispute 
would be for MZM to have agreed to a New Jersey statewide 
[CBA] with an arbitration provision, which MZM never did.” 
(emphasis added)).  Contrary to the Funds’ assertion, Perry 
does not allege that Taylor “offered assurances that, whatever 
the document might say, the parties had actually entered into a 
more limited agreement.”  Appellant’s Br. 45 (emphasis 
added).  MZM’s contention is that Perry relied on Taylor’s 
confirmation that the documents reflected their oral 
understanding when in fact it was something “radically 
different.”  JA50, 53 (Compl. ¶¶ 58, 88). 
Because MZM stated a claim of fraud in the execution 
of the container contract, MZM put the formation of the 
delegation provision in issue and thus triggered the District 
Court’s power to adjudicate that claim. 
 
13 The complaint does not contest the Funds’ contractual 
right to invoke the terms of the 2002 CBA’s arbitration 
provision if it were binding on the parties, even though the 
Funds did not sign the CBA and it provides that “[o]nly the 
Union or the Association may submit a dispute to arbitration” 
under that agreement.  JA97 (2002 CBA art. 21.20(b)).  MZM 
raised this issue for the first time at oral argument before this 





C. Standard of Review Applied by the District Court  
The final question is whether the District Court erred by 
ordering limited discovery rather than compelling arbitration 
of the arbitrability issue on the face of the complaint. 
Under our decision in Guidotti, when it is clear on the 
face of the complaint that a validly formed and enforceable 
arbitration agreement exists and a party’s claim is subject to 
that agreement, a district court must compel arbitration under 
a Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard “without discovery’s delay.”  
716 F.3d at 776 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  But if 
the complaint states a claim or the parties come forward with 
facts that put the formation of the arbitration agreement in 
issue, the court may authorize “limited discovery” to resolve 
that narrow issue for purposes of deciding whether to submit 
the matter to arbitration.  Id.  After discovery, the court may 
consider the question anew, using a summary judgment 
standard under Rule 56.  Id.  If a genuine issue of material fact 
remains, the court must proceed summarily to trial on “the 
making of the arbitration agreement.”  Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).  
In following these procedures, courts must balance the FAA’s 
competing interests in moving arbitrable claims speedily and 
efficiently into arbitration and in ensuring that the parties have 
in fact agreed to arbitrate.  See id. at 773. 
The Funds contend that the District Court erred in 
applying a Rule 56 summary judgment standard, rather than a 
Rule 12(b)(6) standard, when it refused to compel arbitration 
of the gateway arbitrability issue, i.e., the claim of fraud in the 
execution.  They believe that if the District Court had applied 




to enforce the delegation provision as valid on its face and 
submit that claim to the arbitrator.14  Not so. 
While the District Court did not specify the standard 
that it applied when it decided to deny arbitration of the 
arbitrability issue, there is enough in the record to deduce that 
it complied with the procedures and standards set forth in 
Guidotti.  At the injunction hearing, the court noted that, 
following discovery, the arbitrability issue would be resolved 
“on a summary judgment standard” or tried if necessary.  
JA459.  In its subsequent opinion denying the motion for 
reconsideration, the District Court elaborated on its earlier 
decision, stating that the preliminary injunction “consist[ed] of 
little more than obedience to the Third Circuit’s command that 
arbitration cannot be ordered unless and until antecedent 
questions of fact are resolved.”  JA8-9 (citing Guidotti, 716 
F.3d at 771).  The court also stated that “[w]hen the issue of 
arbitrability is not apparent on the face of the complaint,” a 
court may authorize discovery.  JA22.   
We understand the District Court to mean that it 
reviewed the arbitrability issue “on the face of the complaint,” 
i.e., under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, before denying the motion 
to dismiss and subjecting the parties to limited discovery.  
Otherwise, by its own logic, there would have been no reason 
to subject the parties to discovery.  We also take the District 
 
14 The Funds take issue with the District Court’s 
decision to consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether 
the SFA and CBA were validly formed.  We see no error.  
Under New Jersey law, parol evidence is admissible to show 
fraud in the execution.  Kero, 78 A.2d at 818; see also Connors, 




Court at its word that it will apply a summary judgment 
standard after limited discovery is complete, not that it has 
already applied that standard.  At that time, all relevant 
evidence that the parties have submitted to date, including the 
1999 SFA, as well as any additional evidence gathered through 
expedited discovery, may be put forward on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
While it would have been preferable for the District 
Court to have explicitly reviewed the sufficiency of the 
pleadings on the record before refusing to compel arbitration 
on the arbitrability issue, that omission was harmless.  As 
explained in section III.B above, MZM has sufficiently alleged 
fraud in the execution of the container contract, putting the 
formation of the arbitration agreement in issue.  Therefore, the 
Funds were not entitled to have that gateway arbitrability claim 
submitted to arbitration on the face of the complaint.15 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court 
decision. 
 
15 Given the FAA’s interests in resolving arbitrability 
issues speedily and efficiently, we have undertaken to review 
the sufficiency of the pleadings ourselves rather than remand 
for that purpose.  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 29 (1983).  Furthermore, we would 
not be able to meaningfully review and affirm the District 
Court’s refusal to compel arbitration of the arbitrability issue 
without satisfying ourselves that MZM stated a claim of fraud 
in the execution, not fraud in the inducement. 
